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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE CALL OF CONSCIENCE
W. Cole Durham, Jr.*
As Professor Washington rightly notes in his essay,' the idea of
conscience is "a major cultural bedrock of American jurispru-
dence."2 His essay excavates and elucidates the intellectual strata
that underlie this bedrock, adding reflections on current social
trends that might erode it. Starting with Descartes and Hobbes, he
sketches an unfolding series of fundamental attitudes toward con-
science that emerged over the course of the century and a half that
separated the English Civil War from the American Revolution. 3
He then lays the significance of conscience as "a notional institu-
tion"4 within American society. According to Washington, the idea
was so widely accepted at the time of the founding that it seemed
unnecessary to work out its deeper meaning.5 Ironically, this neglect
may have contributed to a gradual subordination of the claims of
conscience to statist presumptions and ultimately to what Washing-
ton deplores as the "decline of the culture of conscience.""
What I find particularly interesting is Washington's characteriza-
tion of conscience as "the one institution that [has] provided an op-
portunity to unify humanists and religionists. ' '7 For him, conscience
is "a key member of the fundamental ideas and values which juris-
prudence seeks to uphold."8 It is a "venerable conceptual apparatus
that [has] provided the fundamental moral basis for the liberties
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights."9 But this unifying category is suf-
fering from a postmodernist "crisis engendered by cultural diversity,
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A.B., Harvard
College, 1972; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975.
1. James M. Washington, The Crisis in the Sanctity of Conscience in American Jurisprudence,
42 DEPAUL L. REv. 11 (1992).
2. Id. at 11.
3. Id. at 11-22.
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id. at 23-24.
6. Id. at 31.
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 23 n.50.
9. Id. at 31.
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and by cultural perversity in the form of rampant nihilism, and un-
disciplined cynicism."'" I take it that Washington's suggestion that
we "expand the juridical role of conscience by redefining it as 'ad-
herence to the sanctity of the body' "I' is an effort to rehabilitate
the core notion of conscience in areas where social consensus has not
yet disintegrated.
I share Professor Washington's sense that conscience is a
profound cultural category that needs to be protected, strengthened,
and analyzed more deeply. In my comments, I want to probe the
notion of conscience as a common moral denominator in a pluralis-
tic society - as a category and an experience within modern politi-
cal discourse capable of bridging subcultures and of being accessed
as a common moral experience from a wide array of differing belief
systems.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, I will examine a series of
facets of the call of conscience that seem particularly vital and yet
problematic: (1) the centrality of conscience as a moral bridge that
helps integrate, or at least connect, different subcultures and as a
source of moral development; (2) the elusiveness of conscience as a
neutral category in law; (3) the sovereignty of conscience and its
relation to the state; and (4) the attenuation of conscience as a dis-
tinctive liberty right. My approach is to draw on brief vignettes or
reflections on conscience that are richly suggestive, but that cannot
be fully worked out here. While what follows cannot hope to get at
the full meaning of the "notional institution" of conscience, it can
perhaps suggest directions in which further analysis needs to
proceed.
I. CONSCIENCE AS A MORAL BRIDGE: CULTIVATING ITS
INTEGRATING ROLE
Let me begin with a personal experience that has come to symbol-
ize for me what I shall call the integrating or connecting role of
conscience. During the spring of 1991, I participated in writing an
amicus brief in the graduation prayer case of Lee v. Weisman. 2 In
the spirit of full disclosure, I should indicate this brief was sympa-
thetic to graduation prayer. It took the view that our constitutional
tradition should be flexible enough to accommodate differing deci-
10. Id. at 59.
11. Id. at 24.
12. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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sions of local school boards in resolving the difficult issue of
whether, in certain settings, graduation prayers should be allowed.
What I want to describe here, however, is not the arguments of that
brief, but an experience I had the day the brief was finalized and
expressed off for printing and filing.
Once the dust settled and the express shipment was on its way, I
went home to attend my son's high school graduation in the
predominantly Mormon community of Provo, Utah. The week
before, the federal district court in Utah had refused to enjoin grad-
uation prayer in a neighboring school district, pending the outcome
of Weisman. Based on this decision, the determination was made (I
am not sure by whom) that prayers should be added to the program
at my son's graduation. It was clear that this was a last minute
arrangement, because the programs for the ceremony had been
printed without indicating there would be an invocation or a bene-
diction. These were simply announced orally. The student who was
listed on the program as leading the Pledge of Allegiance, with its
reference to "one nation under God," had been "promoted" to giv-
ing a full-fledged prayer, and someone else was substituted to lead
the Pledge.
With the experience of working on a graduation prayer brief so
recently behind me, I found myself listening to the invocation with
the heart of a litigator (simultaneously wondering whether that was
an appropriate way to experience a prayer). The prayer was offered
by a student I knew quite well because she was a neighbor I go to
church with every Sunday. I worried about the many verbal traps
she could fall into, and whether her words would end up being
quoted back and analyzed in the course of litigation, like Rabbi
Weisman's prayer in the Providence case. As I listened to her
prayer, sentence by sentence, I concluded that she had probably
been coached, or given a copy of the guidelines promulgated by the
National Council of Christians and Jews.13 In any event, it was
clear that she had given considerable thought to being sensitive to
other individuals from other religious communities. For example,
she omitted the traditional closing words of a Mormon prayer: "in
the name of Jesus Christ, Amen." At the end of her prayer, I
breathed a sigh of relief. She had done an excellent job of avoiding
interdenominational sensitivities, and at the same time had ex-
13. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHRISTIANS AND JEWs, GUIDELINES FOR CIVIC OCCASIONS.
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pressed feelings that were meaningful and fitting for the occasion.
The commencement exercises then continued without incident.
There were a series of student commencement speeches in which
young people at the threshold of adulthood reflected on the meaning
of their high school experience and on the challenges and opportuni-
ties lying ahead. My son was one of the speakers, and so I had a
deeper than average personal stake in what he and his friends were
saying.
What I will always remember, however, is the prayer that came
at the end of the ceremony. It started out in English, but the student
offering it was a Chicano, and most of his prayer was in Spanish.
When he first switched languages, I could not resist thinking this
would be a very nice touch if the matter ever came to litigation;
those challenging such a prayer would have to attack good faith ef-
forts to include minority groups in the ceremony. But as the prayer
went on and the force of what was happening sank in, most of us in
that audience felt something much more profound. While few could
literally understand what was being said, we understood that the
young Chicano was engaging in an exercise of deep personal mean-
ing at a particularly important moment in his life. We heard, or
better, felt the call of his conscience, emanating from another cul-
ture in another language and another voice, and in that moment of
encounter, something was translated into our own modes of respond-
ing to the experience of conscience, thereby opening a channel to the
highest within each of us. The experience confirmed us at once in
our unity and in our diversity, providing us with a glimpse of the
way that even distinctive assertions of conscience can have an inte-
grating influence that bridges cultural distance.
Reflecting on this experience has led me to rethink one recurrent
refrain in the graduation prayer litigation leading up to Lee v. Weis-
man. One of the issues for litigants defending graduation prayer
under the Lemon test'" was to establish that the practice had a le-
gitimate secular purpose. This was often done by arguing that the
state had a legitimate purpose in fostering the "solemnity" of cere-
monial occasions. At one level, there always seemed to be something
disingenuous about this argument. First, it was not altogether clear
what was so important about getting people to put on long faces and
be "solemn," and second, prayer was surely not the only means
14. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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available to promote this objective."5 After the experience at my
son's graduation, however, I have concluded that such "solemnity"
arguments may be more persuasive if one understands them as an
assertion that the state has a legitimate interest in fostering contexts
in which its citizens are exposed to the call of conscience.
Of course, it is not possible to define in advance the way con-
science calls to different people, nor is it advisable for the state to
dictate the forms such a call should take. But there ought to be
room, within the traditions and institutions of our pluralistic public
life, for people to be able to express that call as felt by them,
whether in religious or political speech, particularly since such en-
counters have a particularly powerful tendency to speak across cul-
tural boundaries and to promote mutual understanding and respect.
It is vital that there be moments when we are called upon to tap
that which is deepest and most meaningful in us, and when that
happens, we respond across differences, and even if we do not under-
stand perfectly, we understand what is most fundamental.
With its decision in Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively struck the death knell of graduation prayer,"0 and this
facet of the traditional rite of passage into American adulthood will
become a forgotten relic of times past. American civilization will no
doubt survive without this small piece of traditional Americana.
Graduation prayers are obviously not the only or even the most im-
portant contexts in which the call of conscience can be encountered.
Private contexts within families or churches or among friends are
probably far more important. But it is vital in a democracy that the
call of conscience also be felt in public settings. And it is important
in that setting that conscientious expression not be hobbled by being
forced to speak in the broken accents of a foreign mode of expres-
sion. Just as the impact of the benediction at my son's graduation
15. 1 leave aside for the present the question of why it should be that secular purpose analysis,
in a curious inversion of free exercise least restrictive alternative analysis, should be understood as
requiring the least religious alternative. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-26 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407
(1963).
16. Notwithstanding Justice Souter's footnote stressing factual distinctions in the Weisman sit-
uation, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 n.8 (1992), and Justice Scalia's dissenting hints about how the
Court's holding could be circumvented, id. at 2678-86, 1 assume with some reluctance that the
institution of graduation prayer as it has existed in many school districts throughout America is
dead. The in terroram threat that someone might win a suit challenging even a suitably modified
and voluntary graduation prayer scheme and thereby be entitled not only to an injunction but also
to legal fees is too great a risk for most fund-starved school districts to run.
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had infinitely more force in Spanish than it would have had in En-
glish, so it is important that we allow conscience to choose its own
voice. Conscience is a rare enough commodity in public life; we
should not encumber it with artificial constraints.
The deeper question posed by the Weisman decision, as by Profes-
sor Washington's paper, is whether our resources for cultivating en-
counters with conscience are being diminished. Such encounters are
vital to moral education and development and to the cultivation of
conscience itself. They are crucial for the cultivation of what classi-
cal republicanism described as "public virtue" - the commitment
to sacrifice personal interests to the public good. Modern societies,
and for that matter, societies of any vintage, have an important in-
terest in cultivating this facet of moral education.
Will Weisman be extended in ways that further restrict tradi-
tional expressions of conscience in public settings? Outside the
school setting, will the ban on educational prayers be extended to
local legislative bodies such as city councils, or will the traditional
practices in that context be shielded by Marsh v. Chambers?17 If
such practices are permitted, is it better to regulate the content of
prayers offered to minimize the risk of causing offense, or should
those offering prayers be allowed to be faithful to their traditions,
assuming some suitable rotation scheme is arranged? The latter
seems preferable to me. What will be the likely fruits of Weisman
within schools? Can we expect challenges to the singing of sacred
choral music, or to the participation of school choral groups in
Christmas season programs? More generally, what role, if any,
should be given to public school teachers in cultivating basic moral
traits such as honesty, industriousness, and moral courage? How
should more difficult moral issues be approached? In a pluralistic
world, where it is impossible to avoid alignment with some value
orientation (even a non-stand is a stand), how can schools possibly
accommodate all the value preferences pressed upon them? Which
issues need to be dealt with in the schools, and which are better left
to other fora?
Few of the foregoing have the ring of classic confrontations of
conscience and the state. But where does the strength for the more
classic confrontations come from? Conscience is a fragile resource
in any society, and great care must be taken to nurture it. Along
17. 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983) (upholding "the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each
legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State").
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with our efforts to cultivate a robust marketplace of ideas, we need
to leave ample room for the development of resources of conscience
which help rank and assign weights and values to the ideas being
exchanged.
1I. THE ELUSIVENESS OF CONSCIENCE AS A NEUTRAL CATEGORY
Precisely because it is so central and important, the idea of con-
science suggests itself as an answer to several recurring puzzles.
Perhaps the notion is sufficiently broad to cover the deepest moral
instincts of both religious and secular citizens, suggesting that what
should really be covered by religious liberty protections (to avoid
favoritism) is freedom of conscience. Seen in this light, conscience
appears as a possible notion in terms of which religion can be de-
fined. Moreover, the notion of conscience as a moral sovereign
within the individual may help to explain why religious liberty (or
liberty of conscience) deserves heightened protection in comparison
with other rights.
But no sooner does one start down these paths than one begins to
worry that the idea of conscience may not be such a neutral idea
after all. This "notional institution" may be more central for Protes-
tants than for Catholics and Jews, and appears almost irrelevant to
certain forms of Native American religions.'" If this is true, con-
science may be neither as universal nor as neutral as initial reflec-
tion might suggest.
Yet we should not be too quick to dismiss conscience as a central
organizing category. It may well be that conscience is experienced
differently and that different importance is attached to conscience
by Protestants than by Catholics or Jews or Native Americans. But
it does not follow that it is simply absent. The difficulty may lie
more in the elusiveness of conscience - its affinity for concrete
practical judgment as opposed to grand system, and its tendency to
resist being bottled up in conventional moral categories. The fact
that conscience may speak several languages does not mean that it
does not speak.
In this regard, an incident from Mark Twain's Huckleberry
Finn'9 is worth rereading. The passage is relevant to Professor
18. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., The Aboriginal and Comparative: A United States Perspective,
34 AM. J. COMP. L. I (Supp. 1986).
19. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1885), reprinted in THE UNA-
BRIDGED MARK TWAIN 748 (Lawrence Teacher ed., 1976).
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Washington's discussion of conscience in the context of opposition to
fugitive slave laws,20 but I believe it captures something more gen-
eral. The passage occurs at the point where Jim has been betrayed
for forty dollars by the "king" and the "duke" and he has now been
captured.21 Huck is in a real quandary about what he should do. He
is fully conscious of what conventional conscience demands in his
society. Being an abolitionist in his hometown was not particularly
popular. Indeed, a little later in the narrative, Huck is actually
shocked when conventional Tom Sawyer appears and agrees, at
least initially, to help him free Jim.2 2 In this quandary, Huck tries
to pray to figure out what to do:
I was trying to make my mouth say I would do the right thing and the clean
thing, and go and write to [Miss Watson] and tell where [Jim] was; but
deep down in me I knowed it was a lie - and [God] knowed it. You can't
pray a lie - I found that out.
So I was full of trouble, full as I could be; and didn't know what to do. 8
In agony of conscience, Huck finally decides he needs to do what
society or state tells him is the right thing to do:
At last I had an idea; and I says, I'll go and write the letter - and then see
if I can pray. Why, it was astonishing, the way I felt as light as a feather,
right straight off, and my troubles all gone. So I got a piece of paper and a
pencil, all glad and excited, and set down and wrote: Miss Watson, your
runaway [slave] Jim is down here two mile below Pikesville and Mr. Phelps
has got him and he will give him up for the reward if you send, Huck
Finn.2'
At first this seems to work: "I felt good and all washed clean of sin
for the first time I had ever felt so in my life, and I knowed I could
pray now."' 25 But Huck has never been someone to jump into things
precipitously - especially do-gooder things - and so he meditates
a bit further. And now another process sets in. Huck does not quite
know what to make of it, and thinks it makes him perverse because
it goes against conventional morality, but in fact, it is genuine
conscience:
But I didn't do it straight off, but laid the paper down and set there thinking
... .And got to thinking over our trip down the river; and I see Jim before
20. Washington, supra note 1, at 40-41.
21. TWAIN. supra note 19, at 898.
22. Id. at 908.
23. Id. at 899.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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me, all the time, in the day, and in the nighttime, sometimes moonlight,
sometimes storms, and we a floating along, talking, and singing, and laugh-
ing. But somehow I couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against
him, but only the other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top of his'n,
stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see him how glad he was
when I come back out of the fog; and when I come to him again in the
swamp, up there where the feud was; and such-like times; and would always
call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and
how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him by telling
the men we had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was
the best friend old Jim ever had in the world, and the only one he's got now;
and then I happened to look around, and see that paper.
It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I was a trem-
bling, because I'd got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it.
I studied the minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself:
"All right then, I'll go to hell" and tore it up.
It was awful thoughts, and awful words, but they was said. And I let
them stay said; and never thought no more about reforming. I shoved the
whole thing out of my head; and said I would take up wickedness again,
which was in my line, being brung up to it, and the other warn't. And for a
starter, I would go to work and steal Jim out of slavery again; and if I could
think up anything worse, I would do that, too; because as long as I was in,
and in for good, I might as well go the whole hog."
This passage has enduring appeal precisely because it captures what
is uncapturable about conscience - its ability to break through en-
crusted moral conventions and expectations. Of course, this is also
what makes conscience dangerous. From the perspective of law, con-
science is a political renegade as well as a loyal citizen. And yet,
despite this very real risk, and subject inevitably to some outer lim-
its, part of what pluralism and democracy ultimately mean is that
judgments of conscience should be trusted and respected. At a mini-
mum, when we get into our own "close places," we want to let the
words of our own consciences "stay said."
III. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF CONSCIENCE
The question of the extent to which conscience should be
respected and of the reasons for affording such respect leads into
some of the deepest questions of political theory. To what extent
should the claims of individual conscience, and of communities of
conscience, be granted deference over claims of the state? Do we
respect claims of conscience as part of a more general respect for
personal autonomy and self-determination of individual life plans?
26. Id. at 899-900.
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If so, why should life plans forged by conscience be afforded any
greater protection than life plans molded by other factors? Does
conscience differ in some fundamental way from other desires, and
does this difference justify granting claims of conscience higher sta-
tus than the claims of the desires?
As Michael Sandel has noted, there is a tendency in the contem-
porary setting to confuse freedom of conscience with freedom of
choice.27 In contemporary liberal theory, the individual is viewed as
being "free and independent, unencumbered by aims and attach-
ments it does not choose for itself."28 The unencumbered self
chooses religion as it chooses everything else, and freedom of reli-
gion is to be respected as part of a more general respect for personal
autonomy and freedom of choice.
This picture is inconsistent in fundamental ways with the experi-
ence of conscience. To use Sandel's words:
[F]reedom of conscience and freedom of choice are not the same; where
conscience dictates, choice decides. Where freedom of conscience is at stake,
the relevant right is to exercise a duty, not make a choice. .... Religious
liberty addressed the problem of encumbered selves, claimed by duties they
cannot renounce, even in the face of civil obligations that may conflict.29
The call of conscience may guide choice, but it does not emanate
from choice.
This certainly appears to be the way that Madison understood
conscience. In the first paragraph of his Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments,"0 he and his co-petitioners
objected to Patrick Henry's "Bill establishing a provision for Teach-
ers of the Christian Religion" because:
We hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that Religion or the
duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence." The Reli-
gion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable;
27. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH,
ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
74 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
28. Id. at 75.
29. Id. at 88.
30. James Madison, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS. re-
printed in The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 5 (Mar-
vin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). Memorial and Remonstrance is also reprinted as an appendix to
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947).
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because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated
by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalien-
able also, because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the
Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage,
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Soci-
ety. Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he
must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe:, And if a
member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must
always do it with a reservation of his duty to the general authority; much
more must every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Soci-
ety, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We
maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by
the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion -is wholly exempt from its
cognizance. True it is, that no other rule exists, by which any question
which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of
the majority; but it is also true, that the majority may trespass on the rights
of the minority.31
This brief passage, with its social contractarian picture of the rela-
tion of individual conscience to the state, provides one of the most
profound analyses of freedom of conscience that I know. Here I can
only highlight a few features of this account.
Like Jefferson 32 and Locke33 before him, Madison advocated a
jurisdictional division between religion and government, but he even
more clearly than they believed that dividing lines should be based
on the demands of religion and not merely on the secular concerns
of the state. These demands of religion are clearly not perceived in
terms of what Sandel describes as freedom of choice. Men and
women must be free to exercise religion as "conviction and con-
science . ..dictate. ' 34 They enter into the social contract not as
beings lacking other moral obligations. (Indeed, the decision to enter
into the social contract itself may reflect preexisting moral obliga-
tions, rather than mere expediency or practical judgment about pro-
moting self-preservation, as Hobbes would have it.)
The important point is that religious obligations are "precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society."3 5 Claims of conscience are not like other obligations -("a
31. Madison, supra note 30, at 7 (emphasis added).
32. See 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (1854).
33. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in 33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD I (Mortimer J. Adler et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990) (articulating Locke's thoughts on
religious toleration).
34. Madison, supra note 30, at 7.
35. Id.
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right towards men") that can be compromised by mutual consent in
the process of accepting the social contract. They are more immedi-
ate and fundamental and by their very nature take priority over the
claims of civil society. Conscience is something innate and natural.
Someone entering civil society may do so only "with a reservation of
his duty to the general authority."36
Madison's picture portrays religious liberty as a matter of inter-
acting sovereigns - the Creator as the ultimate source of conscien-
tious obligation, the individual as the vessel of conscience, and civil
society as an artificial construct whose very existence is conditioned
and bounded by preexisting obligations set up by the other two
sources of sovereignty. Significantly, liberty of conscience is in no
sense derivative from the state. Exemptions for conscientious con-
duct are not bestowed as a matter of grace by the state, nor are they
the functional equivalent of aid, subsidization, or preferred treat-
ment. They are simply reserved spheres of free conduct built into
the original structure of the social compact.37 The state should strive
for arrangements that maximize equal protection for the conscience
of everyone, but this imperative does not imply that all spheres of
conscience must be kept equally small, or that there is a violation of
the equality of some not in need of an exemption when an exemp-
tion for others respects the contours of conscience.38 What needs to
be evenhanded in state action in this area is equal restraint from
encroaching on the reserved sphere of conscience. The state's funda-
mental obligation is to avoid taking steps that will hamper the call
of conscience. Thus, it should protect freedom of expression,
proselyting, persuasion without coercion, and a wide range of other
contexts in which the call of conscience can be articulated, lived,
36. Id.
37. It should be understood here that in talking of entry into the social contract, I am not
presupposing a literal historical event. The social contract device is merely a schema for thinking
about the nature of obligations. At the same time, the idea of the social contract is not totally
without historical analogues. An interesting historical example is provided by the Mormon
Church, which first attempted to leave the United States and establish its own community in the
Great Basin, but ultimately decided to apply for statehood. Note that a community of conscience
may have different incentives and reservations with respect to entering civil society than an indi-
vidual. Among other things, an individual may need civil society for the sake of having member-
ship in a community; that problem has already been solved when it is a community that is seeking
admission to a larger society.
38. This is the fundamental flaw I see in the writings of William Marshall and others who
support the outcome in the Smith decision and object to religiously based exemptions on equalita-
rian grounds. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against The Constitutionally Compelled
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 357 (1989).
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and felt by others. Actions which prematurely cut off the possibility
of one group's hearing the call of conscience as expressed by another
are illegitimate. One individual or group may ultimately reject an-
other's views, but it is important that such calls to what is deepest
within us should be heard.
This outlook has significant practical implications for the way
that one thinks about the problem of defining the outer limits of
religious liberty. I believe the Madisonian position, if fully worked
out, 9 supports an approach in which the state is required to be
highly deferential to the way that conscience itself defines those lim-
its. That is, in contrast to the Hobbesian assumption that the state is
the ultimate arbiter of matters of conscience,4 or Penn's assumption
that conscientious conduct should stay within "the bounds of moral-
ity," 4 1 or the Lockean view that conscience should give way before
validly enacted law,42 the deferentialist position that I propose holds
that subject to certain narrow exceptions, the state is obligated to
defer to the dictates of individual or community conscience and not
to interfere with or proscribe the conduct thus required. The excep-
tions to the deference requirement, like the requirement itself, flow
from the social contractarian model. While Madison believes that
the claims of conscience are "precedent both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,' 43 he does not
say that conscience is prior to nature or human society per se. The
demands of conscience arise within and presuppose the natural so-
cial situation that preexists civil society. Conscience presupposes
conditions that make ongoing human existence possible. Accord-
ingly, it is reasonable to think that the "reservation" for the rights
of conscience implicitly written into the social contract would not
necessarily bar state action aimed, for example, at protecting public
health or safety, so long as every effort is made to minimize the
impact on conscientious conduct of any state action thus required.
In some areas, state intervention may be appropriate because it
39. That is to say, I am not necessarily claiming that Madison himself held the full deferential-
ist position I describe. But I believe his conception of the relationship of conscience and civil
society supports the deferentialist approach.
40. See Washington, supra note 1, at 14.
41. Id. at 18 (citing 2 THE SECRET WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 507 (4th ed., London, William
Phillips 1825)).
42. Id. at 20-21 (citing JOHN LOCKE, EPISTOLA DE TOLERANTIA: A LETTER ON TOLERATION
(Raymond Klibansky ed., J.W. Gough trans., Latin text ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1968).
43. Madison, supra note 30, at 7.
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deals with matters that require no reservation to protect conscien-
tious practices. Inherent in the idea of entering into the social con-
tract is sacrificing or exchanging some liberties for the greater mea-
sure of freedom, security, and justice that can be experienced in
civil society. Most churches, for example, have no conscientious rea-
son to object to regulations that regulate the number of parking
spaces that must be provided when a new church building is con-
structed, and there are obviously numerous similar "matters indif-
ferent." What is vital in using this mode of justification for state
intrusion is that the state action appear natural and that it not be
experienced as an encroachment on conscience from the perspective
of the individual or group whose conscience is possibly being bur-
dened. Contrary to the decision in Employment Division v. Smith,"
the issue is not whether state legislators or bureaucrats think that a
law or action is neutral. The state only has jurisdiction to regulate
conduct not reserved from state intervention in connection with en-
try into civil society, and in the absence of some indication of fraud
or lack of sincerity,4" there is no reason to think the state is in a
better position to assess whether conscience is being infringed than
the person or community whose conscience is burdened.
Reasoning such as the foregoing accounts for a large proportion
of justifiable exceptions to religious liberty claims. There is inevita-
bly a residue of particularly difficult issues where such analysis
breaks down, whether because of radical irresolvable conflict of
opinion that must be resolved one way or another, or where state
interests appear so overwhelming that individual claims of con-
science must give way. Even these cases may be analyzable as a
necessary concession that parties to the social contract might be ex-
pected to give in order to address in advance how the possibility of
such impasses of conscience should be handled.
The point in all of this is that the state is required to take con-
science seriously. Contrary to some traditional worries,4" doing so
44. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45. Note that conscientious individuals or groups might consent to state determination of the
sincerity issue for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that persons of conscience have
the same interest in avoiding freeriders (those who abuse the cloak of religion) that the state has.
Moreover, conscience itself does not dictate feigned assertion of conscience, so there is no reason
for conscience to worry about such a requirement (except that state bureaucrats may make mis-
takes or abuse the authorization to assess sincerity).
46. See, e.g., Washington, supra note 1, at 19 ("There was a pervasive fear of the dangers of
religious anarchy.").
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does not entail anarchic results. A reasonable set of constraints can
be squared with a highly deferential, conscience-oriented approach
to delineating the outer limits of religious liberty.
IV. THE ATTENUATION OF CONSCIENCE
One of the major hazards in our century is that the notion of
conscience is gradually becoming so broad and vague that it is being
emptied of any meaningful content. This process began innocently
enough in the conscientious objector cases. There, the notion of con-
science was defined as "[a] sincere and meaningful [belief which]
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the ex-
emption." '47 Extending the notion of conscience in this direction is
obviously reasonable, because consciencedoes not always wear reli-
gious garb. The difficulty comes when conscience is extended to
cover any deeply felt psychological state experienced at moments of
decision .4
Conscience is more than merely feeling a conflict of desires. It has
to do not only with our sense of moral obligation, but with what
makes our sense of moral obligation sacred, deserving awe and re-
spect. Moreover, as Madison understood, conscience is an imperious
sovereign: its demands are experienced as imperatives, as "dic-
tates."'49 It is not a matter of freedom of choice - of choosing a
"rational plan of life" 50 - or of personal autonomy in the sense of
arbitrary choice. Conscience may be experienced or interpreted dif-
ferently by different individuals or communities, but it is not arbi-
trary. It is something we answer to more immediately than we an-
swer to government or to matters of personal interest. Conscience is
not a mere interest; it outweighs interests. It is what makes utilita-
rian theories seem hollow.
In the latest wave of abortion cases, one recurrent claim has been
that laws aimed at regulating the abortion choice to any degree vio-
late the free exercise rights of at least some women, and possibly,
depending on the structure of the jurisdiction's complicity rules,
47. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
48. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS (forth-
coming 1992) (arguing that it is a mistake to think that the psychological intensity of religious
beliefs requires us to accord these beliefs special protection).
49. Madison, supra note 30, at 7.
50. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 407-16 (1971) (defining the notion of a rational life
plan).
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those of clergy or other religious counselors who feel called to coun-
sel them. The argument runs essentially as follows: (1) abortion is a
deeply personal choice; (2) deeply personal choices are choices of
conscience (or should be guided by conscience); (3) all choices of
conscience are covered by the Free Exercise Clause; (4) abortion
regulation thus burdens a free exercise right; and (5) abortion regu-
lation is therefore an unconstitutional infringement of the free exer-
cise of religion. 5
This line of argument raises a number of questions. I shall leave
to one side the clergy/counselor claims and the question of whether
the state might have a compelling state interest (or even a con-
science-based obligation) with respect to protecting unborn life simi-
lar to that used to justify intervention to give blood transfusions or
other medical care to children whose parents object to such treat-
ment on conscientious grounds. What I am concerned with here is
an inappropriate expansion of the notion of conscientious conduct.
The difficulty is that this argument confuses freedom of choice
and freedom of conscience. Of course, there are some traditions
within which conscience specifies that abortion is morally obligatory
under some limited conditions. For example, orthodox Judaism re-
quires that an abortion be performed where this is necessary to save
the life of the mother. Some other religious traditions recognize sim-
ilar conscientious obligations. Generally, such "dictates of con-
science" are covered by appropriate statutory exemptions, but if
they were not, they appear to be proper "freedom of conscience"
claims. Such claims may not prevail for some other reason (e.g.,
because conscience is subject to certain moral constraints even in
the state of nature that are appropriately translated into "compel-
ling state interests"), but they at least cross the threshold of reflect-
ing genuine conscientious conduct.
The problem is that in a much larger number of cases, the line of
argument described above is invoked in contexts where abortion is
merely permitted by a plaintiff's religious beliefs, as opposed to be-
ing required or at least motivated by the dictates of conscience.52
Innumerable actions are permitted by conscience that are neither
required nor motivated by the conscience as such. This is simply the
51. 1 was involved in opposing such claims in the course of defending Utah's abortion statute
against constitutional attack in Jane L. v. Bangerter, No. 91-C-345 G (D. Utah filed 1991).
52. My position in this paragraph tracks that taken in the Memorandum in Support of Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss, Jane L. v. Bangerter, No. 91-C-345 G (D. Utah filed 1991).
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domain of general liberty, as opposed to conscientious conduct in the
traditional sense. But conduct of this nature does not give rise to
free exercise protection .5  A religion may permit someone to pursue
any number of careers, choose different friends, structure one's lifes-
tyle, select a marriage partner, and so forth. That such choices may
be important and deeply personal, and even that a person may.con-
sult religious advisers or pray about them, does not by itself trans-
mute them into matters of free exercise of religion.5 4
A seductive dynamic is at play here. On the one hand, it seems
attractive to broaden the scope of religious liberty protections by
expanding the range of what counts as conscientious conduct. At
first blush, this appears to achieve a broadening of liberty. Indeed,
equalitarian pressures press for such broadening. What really hap-
pens, however, is that the notion of conscience is gradually attenu-
ated. It comes to be seen as functionally equivalent to other forms of
liberty which it is permissible for the state to regulate. so long as the
state has some rational basis for the regulation. Particularly in the
setting of the complex social welfare state, there are innumerable
points at which conscience does not nest comfortably in the bureau-
cratic castle. Attenuation of conscience ultimately leads to erosion
of its protection.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing comments are at best suggestive of some of the is-
sues that need to be explored to develop a richer account of the role
of conscience in contemporary legal systems. The idea of conscience
has a lengthy history as a "notional institution" that cannot begin to
be exhausted in these brief remarks. It is a concept fraught with
53. Thus, in Harris v. McRae, the Court held that a woman does not have standing even to
assert a free exercise claim against abortion legislation unless "she sought an abortion under com-
pulsion of religious belief." 448 U.S. 293, 320 (1980) (emphasis added).
54. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). Note that the undue extension of the
notion of conscience described here involves a blurring of the distinction between conduct that
conscience leaves open to personal choice and conduct that is required or at least motivated by
conscience. There is a related but different question that arises concerning whether a community
of conscience requires certain conduct of all believers. For example, in most religious traditions,
not everyone is expected to become part of the clergy. From the perspective of the religious tradi-
tion, this is a permissive and not a mandatory requirement. But the individual who decides to
accept this calling is clearly compelled or motivated by conscience to do so. Such conduct clearly
fits within the category of protected conscientious conduct. The conduct in the particular case is
required or motivated by conscience, even though the tradition does not require such conduct of
all its adherents.
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ambiguity and elusiveness, but this is in part what makes it availa-
ble as a category and as an experience capable of facilitating inter-
action and mutual respect in a pluralistic society. A gentle yet ada-
mantine light, it is perhaps the deepest of the natural resources of
human society, and has a special claim to be protected, conserved,
and constantly renewed.
